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Abstract
The UK has been a high profile policy innovator in welfare-to-work provision which has led in the
Coalition government’s Work Programme to a fully outsourced, ‘black box’ model with payments
based overwhelmingly on job outcome results. A perennial fear in such programmes is providers’
incentives to ‘cream’ and ‘park’ claimants, and the Department for Work and Pensions has sought
to mitigate such provider behaviours through Work Programme design, particularly via the use of
claimant groups and differential pricing. In this article, we draw on a qualitative study of providers
in the programme alongside quantitative analysis of published performance data to explore evidence
around creaming and parking. The combination of the quantitative and qualitative evidence suggest
that creaming and parking are widespread, seem systematically embedded within the Work
Programme, and are driven by a combination of intense cost-pressures and extremely ambitious
performance targets alongside overly diverse claimant groups and inadequately calibrated differen-
tiated payment levels.
Keywords
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Introduction
In common with much of the advanced economies (Lødemel and Trickey
2001), since the arrival of New Labour in 1997 the UK has made a decisive
shift from a ‘passive’ to an ‘active’ welfare system in which eligibility for out of
work benefits is tied increasingly tightly and explicitly to the stated obligation
to seek paid work. This policy shift has been justified philosophically through
the reciprocal relationship between rights and responsibilities embedded
within the Third Way (Blair and Schroder 1998; Giddens 2000; Powell 2000)
and has resulted in considerable development of, and evolution in, ‘activating’
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welfare-to-work programmes throughout the 2000s. With the implemen-
tation of the Work Programme from 2011 the UK has come closer to joining
the ranks of other advanced economies in embracing outsourced provi-
sion, devolved decision-making around intervention design and payment by
results.
This evolution in recent decades in welfare-to-work services across the
advanced economies is a result of several interrelated trends and concerns.
There have been significant shifts in the organization of services with the
implementation of contracting out and the creation of quasi-markets to
respond to the critiques of public choice theorists around claims of unrespon-
sive ‘bureaucratic’ state institutions and, more recently, the desire to transfer
risk away from government (Considine 2000; Bredgaard and Larsen 2008;
Mythen et al. 2012). These organizational reforms have been closely associated
with the turns towards new managerialim and contractualism as well as shifts
to ‘new’ governance modes involving changed relationships between the state,
citizens and disadvantaged groups (Ramia and Carney 2000; Considine 2001;
Struyven and Steurs 2005). Lastly, the influence of paternalism (Mead 1986)
on policy discourse, framing and making has strengthened consistently in the
UK since the late 1990s such that the Third Way balance between rights and
responsibilities at the level of the individual has shifted to place greater onus
on individual obligations. Moreover, at policy level there has been a parallel
shift in emphasis away from the ‘carrots’ of policy supports (e.g. childcare,
‘making work pay’) toward the ‘sticks’ of sanctions-backed conditionality in
response to alleged behavioural ‘defects’ (cf. DWP 2010a). Taken together, the
aim for policymakers has been to create more efficient and specialized pro-
vision that is also more flexible, responsive and personalized to the different
needs of unemployed individuals, and against which the unemployed have
limited options but to participate on the terms set out to them.
As discussed in detail below, the evolution of welfare-to-work programmes
in the UK through to the current Work Programme is, in a variety of ways,
clearly influenced by these trends. Of particular interest to the present article
is the extent to which the specific design of the Work Programme is able to
realize the key tenets underpinning international welfare-to-work reform over
the past two decades – efficiency, effectiveness, personalization, value-for-
money, innovation, flexibility – within a programme design which appears to
create multiple tensions and vulnerabilities around achieving these objectives.
Of particular focus here is the challenge for the Work Programme to calibrate
the incentives for providers to work differently in terms of meeting specific
support needs – what Lister (2003) might term a process of ‘differentiated
universalism’. In contrast to this aim, the international literature has consis-
tently raised fears that in such outsourced, payment by results welfare-to-work
schemes (particularly private) providers would respond to financial pressures
and incentives by ‘creaming’ off easier to serve claimants whilst ‘parking’
harder to service clients (Struyven and Steurs 2005; Considine et al. 2011).
These fears have been strongly aired in the UK context from the earliest days
of theWork Programme (PAC 2012) and have escalated, both as the economic
backdrop has become more challenging than anticipated during the design
phase and as evidence has accumulated during the early months of the scheme
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expressing concerns of creaming and parking (Newton et al. 2012; Lane et al.
2013; PAC 2012, 2013; WPSC 2011, 2013; Rees et al. 2013). The argument from
the Department for Work and Pension (DWP) is that the specific design of the
Work Programme – the existence of minimum service guarantees and, in
particular, the use of nine claimant groups with differential payments across
each – would effectively mitigate incentives for prime providers to cream and
park, and the public statements of the DWP remain consistent in arguing that
there is no evidence to suggest that this is not working (PAC 2013). Within this
context, the present article draws on analysis of recently published official
Work Programme data alongside qualitative research on providers’ experi-
ences (Rees et al. 2013) in order to explore early evidence around creaming
and parking in relation to the structures and incentives of the Work Pro-
gramme’s design.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In the following section
the evolution of welfare-to-work policies in the UK since the late 1990s is
outlined with an emphasis on drawing out the key principles and aims under-
pinning that evolution. This is followed by a summary of the international
evidence on creaming and parking, its risks for the Work Programme in light
of the scheme’s stated aim of delivering ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister
2003) in welfare-to-work support and the ways in which the detail of the
scheme’s design seeks to mitigate those risks to achieve that aim. The quan-
titative and qualitative material is then used to analyze the evidence and
experiences around creaming and parking while the last section discusses the
findings and reflects on the implications for Work Programme design and for
international learning.
The Path to the Work Programme: A Radical Departure
from an Established Trend
On coming to power in 1997 after almost two decades in opposition, New
Labour quickly embarked on a series of ‘activating’ New Deal welfare-to-work
schemes. Various New Deals were created for different claimant groups with
different levels of conditionality. New Deal for Young People, for example,
was a mandatory scheme which famously offered ‘no fifth option’ for those
refusing to participate whilst those considered to have more ‘legitimate’
reasons for not working – most notably disabled adults and single parents –
were offered voluntary schemes. In common across all of the New Deals,
however, was a clear emphasis on supply-side measures and a ‘work first’
strategy of propelling working-age welfare recipients back into the labour
market as swiftly as possible (Peck and Theodore 2000). In shifting the policy
focus clearly to the supply-side, demand-side issues around weak local labour
markets and job availability were largely rejected as ‘old Left’ and not feasible
in today’s global economy (Blair and Schroder 1998). Unemployment was,
therefore, recast largely as an individual problem of employability rather than
a structural problem of insufficient employment availability in local areas, a
shift which has been the focus of considerable critique (Theodore 2007;
Wright 2011) but which is seen particularly strongly and explicitly in the
influential Freud report (Freud 2007). Supplementing these New Deals were a
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raft of policies to ‘make work pay’, most notably the introduction of the
national minimum wage, tax credits and benefit run-ons. These incentivizing
policies were combined with greater attention than previously to the frame-
work of policy supports needed, particularly improving the availability of
affordable childcare through the UK’s first ever National Childcare Strategy
and associated policies, such as childcare subsidies for low-income workers,
Sure Start and free childcare places for three and four year olds.
If the early New Labour years were marked by the rapid construction of
this activating welfare-to-work architecture then much of the following decade
can perhaps best be described as one of ‘creeping conditionality’ during which
there was a consistent trend of ratcheting up work-related behavioural
requirements as well as the extension of these work-related conditionality
requirements to traditionally inactive groups, particularly single parents and
the disabled (Dwyer 2004). A critical juncture in the evolution of UK welfare-
to-work policy was the publication of the Freud report in 2007 which received
cross-party support and which was heralded as setting out the principles for
welfare-to-work policies in the forthcoming decade: outsourcing and compe-
tition; ‘black box’ delivery models in which the state allows providers complete
freedom over intervention design; personalized support; and payment by
results. Arguing that unemployment is now frictional rather than structural,
Freud also argued that enhanced conditionality and sanctions were needed to
tackle the alleged behavioural causes of worklessness and the existence of a
‘dependency culture’, despite compelling evidence to the contrary (DWP
2010b; Shildrick et al. 2012). In the face of the empirical fragility of some of its
key claims, the Freud report has, nevertheless, been highly influential to
subsequent policy formulation. Almost immediately it set the template for
New Labour’s subsequent reformulation in 2009 of the main New Deal
programmes into one Flexible New Deal (FND) in which welfare-to-work
support was outsourced from Jobcentre Plus (the public sector employment
support agency covering the UK) to external providers after one year of
Jobcentre Plus support (or six months for fast-tracked claimants). In FND,
financial payments to providers flowed mainly from successful job outcomes.
The arrival of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government
following the 2010 general election heralded a change in policy from the FND
to the Coalition’sWork Programme but also a continuation – indeed, a radical
extension and intensification – of the principles set out in the Freud report
(2007) and onwhich FNDwas designed. Although reflecting continuation from
FND in terms of underlying principles the Work Programme, introduced in
June 2011, is in various ways a genuine revolution in employment support
policy, most notably in terms of the extent of sub-contracting and payments
weighted to job outcomes as well as the ‘black box’ model of delivery. Delivery
of the Work Programme takes place through contracts between the DWP and
large-scale, mainly private sector prime providers which can both deliver
services themselves and/or sub-contract to organizations within large and
(sometimes) complex supply chains sitting underneath each prime. In very
broad terms sub-contractors are either ‘tier 1’, delivering end-to-end services to
participants throughout their time on the Work Programme, or ‘tier 2’, which
contract with primes or tier 1s to provide specific interventions to participants.
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The Work Programme is structured geographically in the sense that Great
Britain is divided into 18 large ‘regional’1 Contract Package Areas (CPAs) with
two or three primes in each CPA to whom claimants are randomly allocated
from Jobcentre Plus if they have not found work within an initial period of
Jobcentre Plus provision, the duration of which depends largely on the type of
out-of-work benefit received and the Work Programme claimant group in
which they are therefore placed. Unlike FND, which contained mandatory
service components, a ‘black box’ delivery model operates in the Work Pro-
gramme so that providers have almost complete flexibility over their interven-
tions, with only minimum service delivery guarantees (which are themselves of
variable ambition, detail and potential enforceability) set out by each prime
provider (Finn 2012). This flexibility is required given that, unlike the various
group-specific New Deals, Work Programme has to cater for the needs of all
different types of largely long-term unemployed claimants within a single
employment scheme, in part reflecting planned changes to the benefits system
in the form of the consolidation of most of the major benefits and tax credits
within the single Universal Credit from 2013.
Creaming, Parking and Differential Payments in the
Work Programme
Creaming and parking by providers have long been considered endemic
problems within welfare delivery systems involving outsourced provision com-
bined with outcomes-based payments (Finn 2011), and international experi-
ence of similar welfare-to-work models highlights the extent of these issues in
practice (Heckman et al. 2002; Dockery and Stromback 2001; van Berkel and
van der Aa 2005; Finn 2011). ‘Creaming’ refers to providers skimming off
clients who are closest to the labour market and targeting services on them in
the expectation that they are more likely to trigger an outcome payment.
‘Parking’ refers to the opposite process, where those individuals deemed to be
unlikely to generate an outcome payment are de-prioritized, perhaps receiv-
ing the minimum service specified in the contract. The issue is closely related
to the more general economic literature around the difficulties in effectively
managing principal-agent relationships via contracts (Bredgaard and Larsen
2008), and is made more likely where regulatory control or organizational
norms or incentives against it are low – most obviously where providers are
private organizations attracted to participation in welfare provision due to a
simple profit motive. Of the 40 contracts won within theWork Programme, 35
were won by private sector primes, three by third sector organizations and two
by public sector organizations, and fears of creaming and parking were strong
from the outset. These concerns intensified in the context of tighter than
expected cost-pressures on primes due to a combination of a more difficult
than expected economic environment which affected job outcome (and hence
payment) levels, the prevalence – and apparent success of – discounting
practices at the bidding stage, and lower than expected caseloads within some
payment groups (Inclusion 2011a).
International evidence suggests that creaming and parking by providers is
widely experienced across different countries (Considine 2000; Struyven and
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Steurs 2005; van Berkel and van der Aa 2005; Bredgaard and Larsen 2008; van
Berkel et al. 2012; deGraaf and Sirovatka 2012). The literature alsomakes clear,
however, that the detail of programme design and payment structures can play
a role in either mitigating or facilitating such provider behaviours (Considine
2000; Struyven and Steurs 2005; van Berkel and van der Aa 2005; Considine
et al. 2011; Finn 2011, 2012). In bringing together such a diverse range of
claimants into one single programme the DWPwas aware from the outset that
this was a challenge for theWork Programme and sought tomitigate these risks
through the programme’s design. This was attempted partly through the
requirement for primes to set out minimum service guarantees but primarily
through the placement of each individual into one of nine Work Programme
claimant groups based on the type of benefit received as a proxy for the level of
their perceived support needs. These claimant groups are important to provid-
ers because they carry with them different entry requirements and, crucially,
different levels of financial reward for job outcome payments, scaled according
to some notion of the average difficulty of transitions to employment for each
claimant group (NAO 2012; Lane et al. 2013). To adopt Lister’s terminology the
issue is one of ‘differentiated universalism’ (Lister 2003) – seeking equality
whilst (indeed, through) recognising difference – whereby policymakers seek to
use the differentiated payments across claimant groups to incentivize Work
Programme providers to treat different claimants differently dependent upon
their distance to the labour market and barriers to work, in order that all
claimants receive the amount and type of support so as to equalize opportunities
to move into employment. Payments across these claimant groups vary from a
maximumof£3,810 for Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA) claimants aged 18 to 25, to
£13,720 potentially for an individual within the Employment Support Allow-
ance (ESA) group for recent Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants. As Robert
Devereux, Permanent Secretary of the DWP, explained to the Committee of
Public Accounts in February 2011, this is a step on from previous programme
design in the UK in the field of welfare-to-work: ‘This set of prices, as has just
been said, begins to move us towards trying to reflect some of the average
difficulty . . . Everything we have done here takes us really a long way forward
compared with where we were’ (PAC 2012).
The DWP’s hope is that, if designed appropriately, differentiated payments
across claimant groups would translate the policy rhetoric of differentiated
universalism into policy reality, mitigating providers’ incentives to cream and
park. Compared to FND, however, and to most comparable international
welfare-to-work schemes operating an outsourced payment-by-results financ-
ing model, the Work Programme weights a smaller share of the provider’s
potential payment to the initial attachment – or joining – fee and a far larger
share to employment transitions and, in particular, sustained job outcomes
(generally measured in the Work Programme as six months of sustained
employment).Within FND the ratio between the initial joining fee, a successful
transition into work and a sustained job outcomewas roughly 40:30:30 (Vegeris
et al. 2011:13) whilst in the Work Programme the ratio is closer to 10:25:65,2
although it varies somewhat across the nine claimant groups. With perfor-
mance outcomes, therefore, mattering to a far greater degree in Work
Programme than in comparable previous schemes it becomes critical to
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successfully mitigating the economically rational incentives to cream and park
amongst primes both that the level of financial payments between payment
groups realistically reflects the relative difficulty of moving claimants within
these groups into (sustained) employment and that these claimant groups are
relatively homogeneous internally such that a single level of payment realistically
reflects the needs of all claimants within each claimant group. If either of these
assumptions is not satisfied then there should be a logical expectation that
creaming and parking will take place if providers are assumed to be economi-
cally rational and if they are confident that creaming and parking will go
undetected and/or unpunished. In the following section the overarching
question which the discussion of the quantitative and qualitative material seeks
to answer is a simple one: does it appear that the DWP has succeeded in
designing a scheme which mitigates against providers’ incentives to cream and
park?
Data and Methods
The quantitative analysis draws on the Work Programme’s official statistics
published online by the DWP. These statistics show the numbers of unem-
ployed people referred and attached to the Work Programme and numbers of
job outcome payments made to providers as a result of participants achieving
sustained employment (six months of employment or three months for
members of ‘harder to help’ payment groups) (DWP 2013). We construct the
DWP’s preferred ‘job outcome rate’ measure (job outcomes/referrals) from the
most recent official programme statistics, and this covers the period from
programme launch in 2011 to the end of September 2013. The qualitative
analysis draws on a research project which involved key informant interviews
and case studies of delivery in two localities (Rees et al. 2013). The eight key
informant interviews included respondents from third sector and employment
services infrastructure organizations, private and third sector prime contractor
organizations, and some large national third sector organizations delivering the
Work Programme as sub-contractors. The case studies of delivery were located
in two areas chosen to provide geographical and labour market diversity
(inner-city vs. semi-rural, north vs. south England) and different supply chain
models. In each area a brief ‘mapping’ exercise identified the role and type of
organizations in the supply chains. Thiswas followed by a phone survey of these
sub-contractors (approximately 65 per cent contacted) which confirmed a
number of their basic characteristics, their position and role in the supply chain
and the nature of their provision. These issues were further explored in two
focus groups with sub-contractors (one each for tier 1 and tier 2 providers) held
in one of the localities. Lastly, interviews were conducted with four of the five
private sector primes operating in the two sampled areas (the fifth declined to
take part) and 14 of their sub-contracted providers.
Differential Payments but Still Differential Outcomes:
Rhetoric vs. Reality in the Work Programme
As a first step in understanding claimants’ differing needs, profiling tools have
become increasingly commonplace within welfare-to-work programmes both
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in the UK and internationally. Within the Work Programme prime providers
are adopting a whole range of approaches to profiling and using these analyses
to guide (at least in the first instance) the intensity and type of interventions
targeted at the individual (Newton et al. 2012: 47–9). Tellingly, however, rather
than adopting the DWP’s claimant groups as the structure for their activities,
prime providers tend to develop their own streams of claimants and related
intervention packages, suggesting that the differentiated payments embedded
within the Work Programme’s claimant groups may well not correspond to
providers’ view of claimants’ distance to the labour market. Rather, comment-
ing on the providers’ use of these profiling tools one provider suggested that
the RAG (red, amber, green) rating system3 used by some primes and their
end-to-end providers to ‘triage’ their caseloads was, in effect, a mechanism for
creaming those rated ‘green’, focusing energies and resources on those easiest
and most likely to move into work, whilst parking claimants rated ‘red’ who
are considered to need more time and resource to support back into work.
Asked if this was the case, one sub-contracted provider stated:
‘That’s done openly. [At the first customer assessment] you’d give an anticipated job
start date and you categorise people on day one into red, amber and green categories . . .
So from day one you’re categorised and if you’re a green customer you’ve got an
anticipated job start date, you’ve got an action plan to work towards that, and you have
to be seen so that is once or twice a week. So you’re pushed. If you’re amber your job
start date is obviously further away, and it’s the expectation that you’ll have activity
at least once a fortnight. If you’re red it could be a phone call once a month. So people
are not using the word parking because it’s politically incorrect, but it’s happening.’
(tier 2 provider)
Indeed, Work Programme providers with long-standing experience of
welfare-to-work provision argued that such practices were not just endemic
but that they could also be seen as a rational response to the current payment
by results model and its misalignment with the actual support needs of indi-
vidual claimants across and within the claimant groups. Nevertheless, while
interviewees expressed the view that most providers would cream if given the
chance there were a number of ways in which potential mechanisms for
creaming could be shut off. One was strict random allocation of jobseekers
between a prime’s ‘in-house’ delivery and delivery by their ‘end-to-end’ deliv-
ery partners. One prime claimed this was preferable in any case because it
permitted proper comparison of performance between providers in the supply
chain and, therefore, improved performance management, but it was impos-
sible to verify whether this system could in reality be circumvented. The
incentive for primes to cream skim could be removed entirely where they
outsourced all delivery to their sub-contractors, as is the case with a number
of primes in the Work Programme; but certainly this may in effect push the
issue down to the sub-contractor level. Whilst feeling that creaming and
parking were hard to avoid in the current design given the intense dual
pressures around costs and targets, not all providers were comfortable with
these practices. This provider, for example, was uncomfortable behaving in
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this way towards claimants but felt torn by the need to deliver the targets for
the organization within the budget available:
‘So we are going to have these numbers of customers that perhaps may never find
employment in the two years. We’ll never be paid for them either but we’ll be paid for
the other 50% that are likely to go on into work so there’s a level of parking going on
which we’re not particularly comfortable with but we also need to achieve what we need
to achieve and what the primes need to achieve so it’s trying to get a balance really.’
(tier 1 provider)
However, another provider argued that parking was a sensible way to manage
the caseload and that the extent of parking would need to be assessed over the
full length of the attachment period:
‘I think from a provider perspective we are expected to prioritise customers that are
coming through who are job ready and to move those through as quickly as we can, and
I think from a financial perspective that’s realistic because you’ve got to get the money
in the system to keep it all flowing. I don’t think you purposefully park people but it
could seem like that from the outside because it’s taking longer to get those people job
ready or . . . they’re being referred onto, say, drug and alcohol services who will be
working with them and until they have their condition managed then you can’t work
with them. So there might be a perception of parking because it’s taking longer and
efforts are, at this group, to move them through [the system].’ (tier 2 provider)
To try to get a sense of the nature and scale of the issue, figure 1 summarizes
the most recent official Work Programme job outcomes data published by the
DWP in December 2013, which covers the first 27months of the programme’s
operation. This is, admittedly, early data in the lifetime of the scheme but it
does suggest problems in the extent to which the current differentiated pay-
ments design is effectively calibrating provider incentives between payment
groups. At its simplest level, the differential payments across the claimant
groups should at least be calibrated so as to equalize providers’ incentives to
work with (of course only notional) ‘average claimants’ between the separate
claimant groups as Devereux’s evidence to the Public Accounts Committee,
cited above, focuses on. If the differentiated payment system is effectively
calibrating providers’ incentives between the Work Programme’s claimant
groups in terms of some idea of the ‘average claimant’ within each of these
groups, then one would, on average, expect the job outcome rates to be
relatively evenly balanced between the various claimant groups. Figure 1,
however, shows in contrast that there are considerable imbalances in job
outcome rates between the claimant groups, suggesting underlying imbal-
ances in the extent to which the current payment levels are equalizing the
balance between costs, risks and returns across these claimant groups. Whilst
the overall job outcomes rate comes out at just under 15 per cent (the hori-
zontal line) two groups are doing markedly better than this average, and a
number of payment groups are doing markedly less well.
Part of the hesitance of providers in adopting the DWP’s claimant groups
as their own framework for targeting claimants reflects their recognition that
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the groups are relatively crude and with significant internal heterogeneity.
This is well known both by policymakers and within the academic literature
yet the persistence of the differentiated payments model attached to such
broad and internally diverse claimant groups has significant implications for
claimants in terms of their increased exposure to systemic risks of creaming
and parking. As a consequence, and in contrast to Robert Devereux’s
response to the Committee of Public Accounts, cited above, the appropriate
question in terms of seeking to design out creaming and parking is not whether
the current programme design is more subtle than previous welfare-to-work
schemes but, rather, whether it is adequate to overcome creaming and
parking. Although it remains early days for the Work Programme, the evi-
dence accumulating here and elsewhere (Newton et al. 2012; Lane et al. 2013;
PAC 2012, 2013; WPSC 2011, 2013; Rees et al. 2013) suggests not. The first
phase of the DWP-commissioned qualitative evaluation of the Work Pro-
gramme, for example, is surprisingly frank for an official evaluation: ‘the avail-
able evidence to date suggests that providers are engaging in creaming and
parking, despite the differential payments regime’ (Newton et al. 2012: 124).
Cost pressures, combined with ambitious targets, were seen by many pro-
viders as a basic but central issue and there was a widespread perception
that whatever process and design improvements might be made that the
underlying reason for creaming, parking and poor performance against the
Figure 1
Differential job outcomes between Work Programme claimant groups
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DWP’s minimum performance standards was under-resourcing of the
programme. As one experienced operator in the welfare-to-work field
commented:
‘Regardless of what the government are saying . . . they haven’t funded it properly to be
able to get a good service. They wanted to move to an all encompassing service and they
had an ideal opportunity to do that, and I for one thought it was brilliant that they did
that . . . and they had a really good opportunity to make sure that that was funded
properly so that we really could see improvement in people going back into work and it’s
just not happening, is it? Or it’s not happening on the scale that they wanted it to’ (tier
2 provider)
Within this pressurized context, primes were acutely aware that claimant
groups were a blunt instrument oriented primarily around the prior benefit
received and not necessarily coterminous with a customer’s distance from the
labour market. This could work in either direction, with some individuals
placed in relatively ‘job ready’ groups attracting relatively low potential pay-
ments (e.g. JSA 18–24 or JSA 25+) actually being perceived by providers to
face serious barriers to moving into paid work. Conversely, some individuals
placed in relatively ‘hard to place’ claimant groups and thus attracting sub-
stantial financial payments for sustained job outcomes (e.g. ESA ex-IB4 claim-
ants) may actually be assessed by primes as needing relatively little support to
move into paid work – the ideal client from a prime provider’s perspective.
This inevitably left providers reflecting on these frequent mismatches between
their own evaluation of the individual’s distance to the labour market and
the Work Programme’s evaluation as proxied by the level of financial
payment attached to that individual’s claimant group. As one third sector
organization described, ‘We’ve got a guy who carries around a mirror in his pocket to
ward off evil spirits. Okay he might be on JSA but he’s a long way from the job market isn’t
he?’ (tier 1 provider). Another provider in a different CPA noted the extent of
undiagnosed mental health issues amongst JSA claimants:
‘There have been a lot of undiagnosed mental health conditions, as secondary [pause]
as secondary illnesses to what’s actually going on . . . some of these people have got
extremely complex barriers before they even think about going into work . . . And yet
they’re a JSA customer and they [pause] the number of times that I want to say, ‘This
person should not be on the Work Programme, they’re probably a work [pause] if
anything, they’re a Work Choice5 customer . . . or they need to be left alone for at least
six months and helped to sort out the other issues that they have.’ (tier 2 provider)
One interesting finding is that whilst the creaming and parking debate, both
here and elsewhere, tends to be framed in the language of incentive structures
and rational economic behaviour, there is evidence that some parking might
arise inadvertently because of the inexperience or inadequate information
held by providers and that there might be a learning curve to go through
similar to that seen in the Job Network (Dockery and Stromback 2001). One
end-to-end provider, for example, described how job advisers within a par-
ticular prime might lack the knowledge (and are bowed by pressure from high
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case loads) to refer jobseekers to appropriate sub-contractors, by implication
leaving them to be parked. Additionally, the initial assessment is supposed to
‘flag’ customer needs but this was not, apparently, working effectively. They,
therefore, decided to send their own staff to work alongside job advisers to
‘drive’ referrals to the sub-contractor:
‘Our workers are backing [named prime] officers making sure that people remember to
refer people to [named tier 1 provider], that actually if you’ve got somebody who’s got
a substance misuse or mental health issue you’re better off referring them to [same tier
1 provider] than holding onto them and not being able to get them a job.’ (tier 1
provider)
Another provider commented similarly that whilst assessment tools may be
widely used they are also far from comprehensively developed or utilized such
that frontline advisers were sometimes ill-prepared to refer effectively:
‘And actually, will those frontline advisors know what to do with that customer? Doubt
it. Probably park them. But what I thought was, right, let me come up with something
that takes the best of what Australia have got in terms of assessment, using health
professionals, occupational therapists, develop that in the UK to make an assessment
that’s face to face, that actually gives direction for that customer so what happens is
now [is progression to specific services].’ (tier 2 provider)
Whilst potentially emerging from informational as well as economic motiva-
tions, therefore, the quantitative material presented in figure 2 is also consis-
tent with, and lends support to, the idea that the current Work Programme
design does not adequately mitigate incentives to cream and park across
different types of claimants within claimant groups in addition to simply between
those groups. To explore this issue, figure 2 focuses on differences in job
outcome rates between claimants with and without employment ‘disadvan-
tages’ relating to disability and single parenthood across the three largest
payment groups which together make up around 80 per cent of referrals to
date. The rationale for these analyses is that single parents and the disabled
might be expected to be ‘harder to place’ for providers and, as such, might
rationally be expected to be more vulnerable to parking.
The trend in figure 2 for lower outcome rates amongst the relatively
‘disadvantaged’ payment group members is seen clearly and consistently
across the three payment groups when comparing participants with a
reported disability against those with no disability. Drawing on the social
model of disability, where societal barriers operate to prevent disabled people
from participating as equals in society (Barnes and Mercer 2003), there are
additional barriers faced by disabled people seeking work (Patrick 2012), and
the additional costs associated with overcoming these barriers may be at play
in lower outcome rates for this group. Clearly, these data do not prove that
creaming and parking are taking place, but they are in line with that practice
and at a minimum highlight that the current differential payments structure is
not calibrated to individual variation.
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The chronic scarcity of care compatible employment opportunities
(Gingerbread 2010) and lack of affordable local childcare (Daycare Trust 2012)
stimulate an expectation that lone parents may face particular difficulties in
securing sustained work from theWork Programme. Figure 2, however, shows
that the story from the Work Programme so far is a little more complex in that
whilst younger lone parents fare consistently less well than younger non-lone
parents in terms of their job outcome rates older lone parents fare consistently
better than older non-lone parents. It is unclear why these findings should be
seen, although it might be partly due to the fact that younger lone parents
have younger children (Coleman and Lanceley 2011) and that, for the reasons
outlined above, younger children present stronger obstacles to lone parent
employment (Bryson et al. 1997). Older lone parents also tend to have stronger
human capital and work histories than younger lone parents (Coleman and
Lanceley 2011).
The JSA Early Access group comprises three separate types of claimants:
mandatory entry of 18-year-olds not in education, employment or training
(NEETs); mandatory entry of JSA ‘repeaters’ (those receiving JSA for 22 of the
past 24 months); and voluntary early entry for pre-identified ‘vulnerable’ JSA
claimants (DWP 2013). Whilst it is impossible to say categorically from the
publicly available data, it seems most likely that lone parents have been
Figure 2
Differential job outcomes within Work Programme claimant groups
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recruited to this group as JSA repeaters and thus to have some recent labour
market experience. When compared with lone parents in the JSA 18–24
payment group, lone parents in the JSA Early Access group are also likely to
be generally older and to have older children. Moreover, whilst job outcomes
are triggered only after six months of sustained work for the JSA payment
groups, this occurs after three months for the JSA Early Entry group, which
will certainly help to make the job outcome rates in this group seem relatively
more impressive than the other two JSA groups.
To explore these issues further our analyses take advantage of the fact that
the Work Programme is broken down into 40 separate contracts with primes
across the 18 CPAs, with some primes delivering across several CPAs and so
having several contracts. Figure 3 extends the quantitative analyses by focus-
ing on the question of consistency in results, again making use of the ability
within the official data to disaggregate job outcomes by disability and single
parenthood. For each Work Programme contract, figure 3 shows the differ-
ence between the disabled and non-disabled job outcome rates (horizontal
axis) and the difference between the single parent and non-single parent job
outcome rates (vertical axis). For both axes, a difference of zero implies
identical job outcome rates between the two groups, positive values mean that
the non-disabled/non-single parent job outcome rate is higher than the
Figure 3
Patterned inequalities in job outcomes across Work Programme contracts
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disabled/single parent job outcome rate, and negative values mean the oppo-
site. Figure 3 is presented as a quadrant, and if the Work Programme’s model
of claimant groups and differential payments was successfully calibrating
providers’ incentives across claimants then one would expect any resulting
differences in rate differences to be due to chance rather than anything
systematic. In this case, the points would tend to centre around zero at the
intersection of the two lines shown and to show a fairly random cloud of points
around that intersection.
In contrast to this neutral picture, figure 3 highlights across the horizontal
axis that disabled participants experience markedly lower job outcomes than
non-disabled participants in every Work Programme contract. Looking
along the vertical axis, there is also a consistent pattern in most (though not
all) contracts that younger lone parents fare markedly less well than younger
non-lone parents. In contrast, however, it is interesting to see that older lone
parents tend to see somewhat better job outcome rates than older non-lone
parents, the result perhaps of the combination of weaker needs for care-
compatible work and childcare along with evidence showing that lone
parents have a particularly strong motivation to work (Tu and Ginnis 2012).
If differential job outcome rates between ‘easier to help’ and ‘harder to help’
claimants are accepted to be an indicator of potential parking then the
consistency in these findings across the 40 contracts lends weight to the
notion that strategies, practices and cultures of prime providers in relation to
creaming and parking may well be involved.
Conclusion
The Work Programme represents a radical extension of the incremental
evolution of employment services witnessed in recent years in the UK. It
implements for the first time, at a national level, a fully outsourced ‘black box’
model with payments based almost entirely on job outcome results. The
programme aims to realize the key tenets underpinning international welfare-
to-work reform over the past two decades but appears to be vulnerable to
multiple tensions inherent within its design. This article focuses on the chal-
lenge for the all-encompassing Work Programme to calibrate the incentives
for providers to work differently, but equally, in meeting the specific support
needs of all jobseekers. The DWP sought to mitigate the identified risks
around creaming and parking primarily through the placement of each indi-
vidual into one of nine claimant groups, each with different levels of financial
payments for job outcomes scaled according to a notion of the average
difficulty of securing transitions to employment in each. The DWP’s hope is
that, if designed appropriately, differentiated payments across claimant
groups would turn the rhetoric of ‘differentiated universalism’ into policy
reality, mitigating providers’ incentives to cream and park.
The combination of the quantitative and qualitative data presented above,
however, suggests that this has not been achieved in practice and that cream-
ing and parking may also be systemic in that they flow directly from
the current design of the Work Programme. If the differentiated payment
system was effectively calibrating providers’ incentives between the Work
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Programme’s claimant groups then one would, on average, expect the job
outcomes rates to be relatively evenly balanced between the various claimant
groups. This is not the case in practice, suggesting underlying imbalances in
the extent to which the current payment levels are equalizing the balance
between costs, risks and returns across these claimant groups. Disaggregating
the data for ‘harder to place’ groups across the 40 Work Programme con-
tracts displays an alarming degree of consistency in the findings that disabled
people and young lone parents experience relatively lower job outcome rates
than their ‘non-disadvantaged’ peers. Far from delivering ‘differentiated uni-
versalism’, the Work Programme at present seems instead to be reinforcing,
exacerbating and making systemic the negative impacts of employment
disadvantages.
Therefore, and in response to the question posed at the outset of the
article, it is extremely difficult to argue on the basis of this evidence that the
DWP has succeeded in designing the Work Programme payment groups and
differential payments such that they mitigate providers’ incentives to cream
and park different individuals either across or within its broad payment
groups, all in a context where providers are experiencing intense pressures
around costs, cash flows and performance. Clearly, these quantitative data
alone do not prove that parking is taking place – one needs to align the
evidence on outcomes with the qualitative evidence around Work Pro-
gramme processes for that – but the patterns seen are perfectly in line with
what would be expected if parking were occurring. When taken together
with the various emerging qualitative evidence discussed here, from the offi-
cial Work Programme evaluation (Newton et al. 2012; Lane et al. 2013) and
from government select committees (PAC 2012, 2013; WPSC 2011, 2013),
then the notion that creaming and parking are serious problems within the
Work Programme becomes compelling.
It will be of particular interest to an international audience that this evi-
dence has been found despite the progression to what, at least superficially,
appears a more complex and nuanced framework from the DWP in terms of
payment groups and differential payments. Whilst value for money argu-
ments from policymakers support a heavy weighting of payments onto job
outcomes this strengthens the ever present challenge to mitigate providers’
incentives to focus their energies and resources where it will pay. Value for
money arguments such as these carry risks around parking, not just for
claimants but also for ongoing social security budgets for those who fail to be
supported into work. At present, it seems the Work Programme design may
not have struck the right balance between value for money, incentives and
claimant protections. With a challenging economic backdrop constraining
job outcomes and with providers – and government select committees
(WPSC 2013) – united in questioning the adequacy of resources within the
programme to meet the support needs of more challenging claimants, such
risks and weaknesses in the programme design are magnified. The challenge
for UK and international policymakers seeking to embrace quasi-marketized
welfare-to-work delivery is to drive forward the evolution of their pro-
grammes, such that they better balance their inevitable tensions between
efficiency and equity.
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Notes
1. The North East, North West, Scotland and Wales are all examples of the scale of
CPAs.
2. Authors’ calculations based on Inclusion 2011b.
3. The RAG rating uses a traffic light system to group individuals either as red (hard
to move into work), amber (moderately difficult to move into work) or green (easy
to move into work).
4. Incapacity Benefit (IB) is currently being replaced by the Employment and Support
Allowance (ESA).
5. Work Choice is a separate employment programme offering support to individuals
with disabilities and long-term health conditions.
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